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Abstract— As Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) are newly 
emerging wireless technologies, they are designed to have huge 
potential for strengthening Internet deployment and access. 
However, they are far from muture for large-scale deployment 
in some applications due to the lack of the satisfactory 
guarantees on security.  The main challenges exposed to the 
security of  WMNs come from the facts of the shared nature of 
the wireless architecture and the lack of globally trusted 
central authorities. A well-performed security framework for 
WMNs will contribute to network survivability and strongly 
support the network growth. A low-computational and 
scalable key management model for WMNs is proposed in this 
paper which aims to guarantee well-performed key 
management services and protection from potential attacks. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
Wireless Mesh Networks, an emerging technology, are 
considered as the promised choices for wireless Internet 
communications since they allow fast, easy, and low-cost 
network deployment.  
The nature of flexible dynamic deployment and the lack of 
the fixed infrastructure expose WMNs to suffer varieties of 
security attacks [4, 5]. It holds back the potential advantages 
and wide-scale deployment of this promising wireless 
networking technology. As various applications of WMNs 
have been explored, the security mechanisms are 
unfortunately far from mature. Appropriate security 
frameworks are never more urgent and important for 
WMNs. While the security of WMNs is a fairly new 
research topic, the starting point can be to adapt some 
existing security schemes designed for wireless ad hoc 
networks and wireless sensor networks which share some 
similarities with WMNs to some extent.  
In this paper, we start with the characteristics of WMNs in 
section II including architecture, advantages and constrains. 
The four main critical security challenges existing in WMNs, 
such as securing routing, securing location information, 
authentication and key management, will be analyzed in 
section III with the emphasis on key management. Existing 
techniques, challenges and potential countermeasures to 
design secure key management schemes will be discussed in 
section III as well. A proposed low-computational and 




II.  CHARACTERISTICS OF WMNS 
 
WMNs are multi-hop and multi-channel wireless networks 
formed by mesh nodes. Unlike traditional wireless 
networks, WMNs rely on each mesh node to keep the 
network connected instead of any fixed infrastructure. 
Instead, wireless mesh nodes WMNs are designed to resolve 
the limitations and to significantly improve the performance 
of ad hoc networks, wireless local area networks (WLANs), 
wireless personal area networks (WPANs), and wireless 
metropolitan area networks (WMANs). Numerous 
applications of wireless mesh networks are being explored 
and new technical results have been achieved.  Wireless 
service providers in personal, home, campus, community, 




WMNs are multi-hop and multi-channel wireless networks 
formed by mesh nodes which are classified into mesh 
routers and mesh clients. The architecture of Wireless Mesh 
Networks in Figure 1 shows that two mesh routers are 
connected to the conventional wired Internet, other mesh 
routers and mesh clients are forming the mesh connections 
and some mesh routers with built-in gateway functions are 
integrated with most of existing wireless networks, such as 
WiMAX, celluar network, sensor and WiFi; one mesh 
router with built-in smart IP is connecting to the wired 
networking. 
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Figure 1.  Architecture of WMNs . 
According to definitions and specifications in [1, 2, 3], 
Mesh routers are usually fixed on the streetlight top, roof of 
buildings, or inside vehicles with no energy constraints. 
Different with the conventional wireless routers, mesh 
routers have additional functionalities to enable mesh 
connections rather than perform only routing and form the 
backbone for the networking. Multiple interfaces of the 
same or different communications technologies are built in 
the mesh routers to accommodate the different networking 
requirements. More coverage can be achieved by using 
multi-hop communication pattern through the neighbour 
mesh nodes. Some mesh routers are connected to the 
conventional wired Internet through the gateway functions. 
The outstanding functionality in integrating Wireless Mesh 
Networks with other existing networks such as the Internet, 
cellular, WiFi, WiMAX and sensor networks and ad hoc 
networks, etc., can be achieved through the built-in bridging 
functions in the mesh routers. Mesh routers can be built on 
general-purpose computer systems or can be built on 
sensitive hardware platforms. Mesh clients are either static 
or mobile with energy constraints and have mesh connecting 
capabilities to communicate with mesh routers and 
themselves. Mesh clients are usually simple hardware with 
simple softwares that a single communication interface is 
built in them and can provide networks access for both mesh 
and conventional clients.  
 
B. Advantages 
• Wireless Mesh Networks are considered fast (local 
packets do not have to travel back to a central 
server), inexpensive (no wired infrastructure), large 
coverage (multi-hop and multi-channel) 
alternatives to WLANs (wireless local area 
network) and backbone networks to mobile clients 
[2].  
• Mesh networks are self configuring: the network 
automatically incorporates a new router or client 
into the existing structure without needing any 
adjustments by a network administrator [2]. 
• Mesh networks are self healing: since the network 
automatically finds the fastest and most reliable 
paths to send data, even if nodes are blocked or 
lose their signal [1]. 
• Wireless mesh nodes are easy to install and 
uninstall, making the network extremely adaptable 
and expandable as more or less coverage is needed. 
They are convenient where Ethernet wall 
connections are lacking, for instance, in outdoor 
concert venues, warehouses or transportation 
settings [1]. 
• Compatibility: WMNs work on the common WiFi 
standards (IEEE 802.11a, b and g) already in place 
for most wireless networks. The existing wireless 
networking technologies such as IEEE 802.11, 
IEEE 802.15, IEEE 802.16 and IEEE 802.20 are 
used for the implementation of WMNs [3]. 
• MWNs may bring the dream of a seamless 
connected world into reality because this promising 
networking technology is designed to have the 
power of integrating with other existing 
wired/wireless networks [3].  
C. Constrains 
There are four main constraints in every current wireless 
networks including wireless WiFi, cellular, sensor, ad hoc 
and WMNs etc. 
• Battery: the total power capacity on the end 
nodes is very limited and only low resource 
consuming devices can be deployed. 
• CPU: the total computing power is limited so 
that devices for large computation are not 
suitable. 
• Scalability: the current wireless networks act 
poorly when the networks enlarged in both 
aspects of members and computation. 
• Mobility: mobile devices expose great pressure 
on the convergence and ability of hand-over to 
the networks. 
 
III. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN WMNS  
 
Except the general security features, saying confidentiality, 
integrity and availability, the nature of flexible dynamic 
deployment and the lack of the infrastructure expose WMNs 
to suffer varieties of security attacks [4, 5, 22]. This holds 
back the potential advantages and wide-scale deployment of 
this promising wireless networking technology. As various 
applications of Wireless Mesh Networks have been 
explored, the security mechanisms are unfortunately 
unexplored. The great starting point can be to utilize and 
adapt some existing security schemes designed for wireless 
ad hoc networks and wireless sensor networks which share 
great similarities with WMNs to some extent.  
Assuming the existence of upper layer security mechanism, 
such as anti-virus software and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) 
protocol [22], there are four main security issues in WMNs 
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including securing routing, securing location information, 
authentication and key management. Due to the vital 
importance, this paper will focus on key management with 
the expected outcome of a low-computational and scalable 
key management framework with well-performed security 
functions and protection from potential attacks. 
 
A. Securing Routing 
In WMNs, the data travels via multi-hops from the source 
node to its destination. The routing protocols for WMNs are 
designed to achieve availability and robustness against both 
dynamically changing topology and external/internal attacks 
[22]. Although routing protocols with well-performed 
security features are under active research [6], very few 
routing protocols have been proposed specifically for the 
newly emerging WMNs. The great similarities between 
WMNs and wireless ad hoc networks make it feasible for 
WMNs to borrow the ideas from the domain of wireless ad 
hoc networks.  
 
B. Securing Location Information 
Most current routing protocols are adopted from wireless ad 
hoc networks including both topology-based and geographic 
routing schemes [4]. For geographic routing schemes, the 
location of the mesh routers are crucial to multi-hop routing 
schemes and thus subject to passive/active attacks. For 
example, the WMNs deployed for the military and public 
safety are relying highly on the location information for the 
sake of safety. While very little research has been done for 
the fairly new WMNs, securing location information has 
been addressed in wireless sensor networks [6]. It is 
inspiring and feasible to utilize some schemes from the 
domain of wireless sensor networks. 
 
C. Authentication 
Most current routing protocols are adopted from wireless ad 
hoc networks including both topology-based and geographic 
routing schemes [4]. For geographic routing schemes, the 
location of the mesh routers are crucial to multi-hop routing 
schemes and thus subject to passive/active attacks. For 
example, the WMNs deployed for the military and public 
safety are relying highly on the location information for the 
sake of safety. While very little research has been done for 
the fairly new WMNs, securing location information has 
been addressed in wireless sensor networks [6]. It is 
inspiring and feasible to utilize some schemes from the 
domain of wireless sensor networks. 
 
D. Key Management 
All the current security mechanisms (e.g. encryption, digital 
signature and authentication) which can be used for WMNs 
are based on cryptographic keys and thus high degree key 
management services are in demand.  
1)  Techniques 
Key management service is responsible for keeping track of 
binding between keys and nodes and for assisting the 
establishment of mutual trust and secure communication 
between nodes [9]. Different approaches for key 
management are listed in [8] including key distribution, key 
transport, key agreement and key updating. Optional 
techniques for designing secure key management schemes 
can be obtained from some successful schemes that have 
been worked out for wireless networks including ad hoc, 
sensor, cellular and WiFi. 
A composite key management service was proposed by Yi 
and Kravets in [10] for asynchronous ad hoc networks 
which achieved the distribution of certificate authority using 
threshold cryptography.  
Utilizing elliptic curve cryptography, Du et al. proposed a 
novel routing-driven key management scheme for 
heterogeneous sensor networks, which establishes shared 
keys only for neighbour sensors that may communicate with 
each other in the key pre-distribution stage. Better security 
can be provided with significant saving on sensor storage 
space and energy consumption than some existing key 
management schemes [10]. The small key size and low 
computation overhead of Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) provides new opportunities to utilize public-key 
cryptography in WMNs.  
Based on a polynomial-based key pre-distribution scheme, 
Ning and Li presented a general framework for establishing 
pair-wise keys between sensors including a random subset 
assignment key pre-distribution scheme and a grid-based 
key pre-distribution scheme [11].  
Li and Xin proposed a distributed key management 
approach by using the self-certified public key system and 
threshold secret sharing schemes [12]. Without any 
assumption of prefixed trust relationship between nodes, the 
ad hoc network works in a self-organizing way to provide 
the key generation and key management services using 
threshold secret sharing schemes, which can effectively 
solve the problem of single point of failure. The claimed 
advantages of self-certified public key system include that 
(1) the storage space and the communication overheads can 
be reduced since the certificate is unnecessary; (2) the 
computational costs can be decreased since no public key 
verification required; (3) there is no key escrow problem 
since the Certificate Authority (CA) does not know the 
users' private keys. As compared with previous work, which 
is implemented with the certificate-based public key system 
and identity-based (ID-based) public key system, the 
proposed approach is more secure and efficient. 
Mu and Liu proposed a mesh based multicast key 
management scheme for mobile ad hoc networks [13]. 
Among multicast groups, some physically more secure and 
subjectively more trustworthy members form a mesh and 
use threshold cryptography to share the responsibility and 
provide group key services with strong security and high 
availability. Adaptive policy and a token mechanism are 
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introduced to avoid conflict during group key updating. The 
analysis shows that the scheme has perfect security and 
efficiency.  
With the future large-scale deployment of worldwide 
wireless connection, group communication is a very 
important pattern in WMNs [14, 15]. Securing group 
communication in dynamic and large-scale groups is more 
complex than securing one-to-one communications due to 
the inherent scalability issues of group key management. In 
particular, the high computation overhead for key 
establishment and key renewing is usually relevant to the 
group size and consequently becomes a performance 
bottleneck in achieving scalability [15].   
Scalability is a desirable property of a system, a network, or 
a process, which indicates its ability to either handle 
growing amounts of work in a graceful manner, or to be 
readily enlarged [16]. There are some successful scalable 
key management protocols.  
Lee and Shieh proposed a new approach that features 
decoupling of group size and computation cost for group 
key management in [14]. By using a hierarchical key 
distribution architecture and load sharing, the load of key 
management can be shared by a group of third parties 
without revealing group messages to them. The proposed 
scheme is claimed to achieve better scalability because the 
cost for key management of each component is independent 
of the group size. 
Mittra addressed the scalability issue by partitioning the 
group members into many subgroups, which are arranged in 
a hierarchy to create a single multicast group in [13]. 
Scalability is achieved by making each subgroup relatively 
independent and thus group membership changes can be 
limited to the respective subgroups. Another essential 
method that helps the protocol to achieve the scalability is 
the subgroup agents, which assist in translating messages 
among subgroups using different subgroup keys.  
2)  Challenges 
Even though all existing key management schemes for 
wireless sensor networks and ad hoc networks are claimed 
to have high security, their weaknesses such as high 
computation overhead, vulnerability to some kinds of 
attacks,  and poor scalability are undeniable [4, 14, 22]. In 
addition, the unique characteristics of WMNs make security 
more challenging. Three challenges with the development of 
key management schemes are identified specifically for the 
new emerging WMNs.  
a) The lack of infrastructure is not the only difficulty 
for key generation but also makes it harder to 
share, transport and update keys in WMNs. 
Additionally, very constrained devices, both in 
computational capacity and input/output 
capabilities, pose great challenges on low-
computational security services. 
b) A distributed CA scheme is required due to the 
absence of a pre-established trusted network 
infrastructure in WMNs obstructing direct 
application of PKI.  
c) Scalability is in high demand due to potential large 
networks deployment resulting from one of the 
main advantages of WMNs, i.e. being adaptable 
and expandable. 
 
     3) Potential Countermeasures 
Keeping all these challenges in mind, more comprehensive 
research is needed to find new approaches to achieve the 
proposed research objectives. One promising and important 
starting point comes from the great similarities that WMNs 
share with wireless ad hoc, sensor networks. The security 
mechanisms within wireless ad hoc and sensor networks 
have been extensively studied. Ideas and methods can be 
borrowed from the domains of wireless ad hoc and sensor 
networks since some successful key management schemes 
have been worked out for them.   Feasibility of combination 
of the unique features of WMNs with existing security 
approaches has been showed by key management protocols 
integrating mesh into ad hoc networks [17]. Even with such 
a promising starting point, it is still very challenging to 
develop a well-performed key management. Some new 
definitions should be worked out to suit the new Mesh 
system initialization. Proper cryptographic schemes need to 
be adapted to have the compatibility with the Mesh 
functions.  
More comprehensive requirements should be considered 
carefully in developing key management schemes specific 
for WMNs. Some designing principles would be as 
follows: 
• Low-computation is a highly pursued feature 
in my research project to avoid the drawbacks 
due to the lack of any wired infrastructure in 
WMNs. Thus, If possible, low-computational 
cryptographic methods, such as symmetric 
cryptographic technique, Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography and threshold schemes, and 
probabilistic approach, should be used rather 
than high-computational schemes, such as 
RSA, asymmetric cryptography and 
polynomial-based techniques. Some new 
definitions and parameters should be 
developed in the system initialization stage 
and some improvement should be done to the 
common cryptographic methods to 
accommodate the Mesh environment.  
•  A distributed CA scheme will be used instead 
of centralised CA to utilise applications of PKI 
which is the most common practice in key 
management. Distributed CA distributes the 
functionality of the centralised CA to the 
whole network by applying threshold 
cryptography [18] which has been proved 
efficient and well-performed. Partially 
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Distributed Certificate Authority, Fully 
Distributed Certificate Authority and Self-
issued Certificates [19] are some successful 
schemes dealing with Distributed CA, but they 
are still not good enough to fully address the 
problem. More work needs to be done to 
explore the finely defined distributed CA and 
bridge the traditional PKI with Mesh 
functions. 
• Scalability is another highly pursued feature in 
order to deal with the stress on scalability 
caused by the potential large-scale networks 
deployment. As an important feature of all 
security mechanisms, scalability is discussed 
in depth by [15] and some scalable key 
management schemes proposed in [15, 13] 
will give researchers inspiration in combining 
the specific requirements of WMNs with 
existing scalable schemes for other wireless 
networks. 
 
IV. PROPOSED KEY MANAGEMENT MODEL  
 
To achieve the objective of developing a low-computational 
and scalable key management for WMNs, this proposed 
model will be carried out in the following steps: 
A.  Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical framework would be designed to 
accommodate Attack Models and Key Management Models. 
In the Attack Models part, the project will start with some 
most well-defined and important attacks including 
eavesdropping (the most common passive attack), DoS 
(Denial of Services) and replaying attack (two most 
common active attacks). The defined attack models would 
be used to analyze the security level of the proposed key 
management schemes, that is, if the proposed schemes 
coped well corresponding to the attack models, then high 
level of security is achieved. If possible, more attacks will 
be measured in order to strengthen the security level of 
proposed key management schemes. Some new definitions 
and parameters should be developed in the system 
initialization stage and some innovative features should be 
added to the common cryptographic methods to 
accommodate the Mesh environment.  Definitions of node 
“joining”, “leaving”, “low-computation”, and “scalability” 
would be given to address the WMN environment at this 
stage as well.   
 
B.  Key Management Model 
At this step, the network model and the system setup would 
be clarified. Three levels of key management schemes 
would be targeted including key management protocols for 
(1) Mesh routers (RR) pattern, for (2) Mesh clients (CC) 
pattern, and for (3) Mesh router and Mesh clients (RC) 
pattern addressing the different status of entities within 
WMNs.  
• RR Pattern: because the mesh routers form the 
backbone for the entire networking and have 
reasonable high input/output capability, highest 
level of security is required. Additional, the RR 
model has the good tolerance of computation 
overhead and most routers are static making the 
Trusted Third Party (CA) possible. Thus, 
complicated cryptographic methods, such as PKI, 
two-party and n-party Diffie-Hellman schemes 
[20], can be used to design the key management 
schemes for RR pattern. 
• CC Pattern: because the mesh clients are usually 
mobile and form the lower layer of communication 
with low input/output capability, low computation 
is the most challenging feature and reasonable level 
of security is required. Thus, in order to design the 
key management schemes for CC model, some 
low-computational cryptographic methods, such as 
symmetric cryptography and threshold secret 
sharing schemes can be used to host the unique 
system requirement. 
• RC Pattern: the key management schemes for the 
Mesh router and Mesh clients (RC) pattern can be 
in between.  
In addition, since these three patterns belong to group 
communication models, the existing results for group key 
management [14, 15, 21] can be a great help to accomplish 
the development of key management schemes for the above 
three patterns.   
Furthermore, for each pattern, key management approaches, 
saying key distribution, key transport, key agreement and 
key updating, would be developed in order to fulfil the 
whole process and functions of key management services. 
As mentioned before, the well-defined distributed CA 
scheme is the bridge in utilising the existing key 
management schemes into WMNs.  
 
C. Security Analysis and Performance Analysis 
The theoretical proof, security analysis and performance 
analysis for the proposed key management schemes will be 
done at this step. Two common tools can be used for the 
simulation at this stage, MatLab, which is a powerful tool in 
the numerical computing area and NS-2, which is popularly 
used in the routing and multi-cast protocols. First of all, the 
mathematical proof would be done to check the proposed 
schemes with aims of having general security features, 
saying confidentiality, integrity and availability, and coping 
well against the defined attack models to ensure the high 
level of security. Then by using Matlab, implementation 
would be carried out to measure the communication and 
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computation costs with the aims of being low-computational. 
Scalability will be simulated to ensure the proposed key 
management schemes can cope well with the large 
extendable networks.  At the end, advantages and 
disadvantages analysis would be provided to evaluate the 
developed key management model. 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
With more and more applications coming out, the 
destination of this promising technology, saying WMNs, 
will be well-performed, secure, and wide-spread wireless 
connection. To support the quality of large-scale 
deployment, it is rewarding and important to address the 
critical key management issue for WMNs. This paper 
proposed a low-computational and scalable key 
management model for WMNs which aims to guarantee 
well-performed key management services and protection 
from potential attacks. Future work in this topic will include 
integrating routing with key management, and providing 
fault-tolerance and robustness for wireless mesh networks 
key management.  
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